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ARTICLES

THE LONG-ARM’S INAPPROPRIATE
EMBRACE
LYNDA WRAY BLACK†
“I’ve got the drinkers and the smokers and the eaters on my side.”1
INTRODUCTION
Forty miles south of downtown Memphis lies the gambling
town of Tunica, Mississippi. Not dissimilar from other gambling
venues, visitors pack the poker tables and fill the concert halls.
Alcohol and money flow freely. Smoke wafts and permeates the
senses. Liaisons consummate. Addictions are indulged. But
underneath the frivolity in Tunica’s gambling halls lurks an
antiquated morality tort that might have a visitor to Tunica
losing more than a poker hand.
I.
A.

THE PLAYERS: GOLFER AND GIRLFRIEND

Meet John Daly

Professional athletes live their successes and failures in an
increasingly public arena.2 The championship victories as well as

†
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Schaffzin for her valuable comments. I also wish to thank the faculty at SULC for
providing me the opportunity to present this article at the Law Center. Finally, I
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Brittany Roberts, and Chelsea Kiss.
1
John Daly Quotes, AZQUOTES, www.azquotes.com/quote/555390 (last visited
June 25, 2017).
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the personal tragedies are front page news.3 The achievements
and struggles of American professional golfer John Daly are no
exception.4 Arguably, the achievements make him a legend, and
the struggles make him real.5 Daly was raised in Arkansas,
taught himself to play golf using golf balls he recovered from a
pond,6 joined the PGA TOUR in 1991 and that same year was
named PGA TOUR Rookie of the Year.7 By the age of thirty,
Daly had achieved two major championship titles;8 he boasts a
total of five career PGA TOUR victories.9 Despite all of his
talent, Daly remains the only eligible two-time major winner
never to be chosen to play in the prestigious Ryder Cup.10
Perhaps his antics on and off the greens are to blame.11 In his
personal life, Daly has been married and divorced four times and
has fathered three children, one each with wives two, three and
four.12 Daly is on the verge of marriage number five. He and his
2
See, e.g., Jimmy Sanderson, Professional Athletes’ Shrinking Privacy
Boundaries: Fans, Information and Communication Technologies, and Athlete
Monitoring, 2 INT’L J. SPORT COMM. 240, 241 (2009).
3
See, e.g., George Diaz, Privacy Is a Game Pro Athletes Have Lost, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, (Nov. 17, 1996), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1996-11-17/news/96
11160878_1_blotter-nick-anderson-athletes (“Their lives are full of confusing
contradictions, reflecting society’s curious demands.”).
4
See Doug Ferguson, John Daly Suspended for 6 Months by PGA Tour, GOLF,
http://www.golf.com/ap-news/john-daly-suspended-6-months-pga-tour (last visited
June 25, 2017).
5
See John Daly, JOCKBIO.COM: MY SAY, http://www.jockbio.com/Bios/Daly/Daly
_mysay.html (last visited June 25, 2017) (“Everybody goes through divorces. There’s
millions of people that have drinking problems. There’s people that their weight goes
up and down, just like mine. It’s just life. And I think people relate to that. I really
do.”).
6
See Kelly Phillips Erb, John Daly Relied on Tax Records to Figure $90 Million
Gambling Losses, FORBES (June 2, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kelly
phillipserb/2014/06/02/john-daly-relied-on-tax-records-to-figure-90-million-gamblinglosses/#5947951e49bc.
7
See Bio, JOHNDALY.COM, http://johndaly.com/bio/ (last visited June 25, 2017).
8
See id.
9
John Daly won the 2004 Buick Invitational, the 1995 Open Championship, the
1994 BellSouth Classic, the 1992 B.C. Open, and the 1991 PGA Championship. John
Daly Player Profile, PGA TOUR, http://www.pgatour.com/players/player.01249.johndaly.html/profile (last visited June 25, 2017).
10
See supra note 7.
11
See generally JOHN DALY WITH GLEN WAGGONER, MY LIFE IN AND OUT OF THE
ROUGH: THE TRUTH BEHIND ALL THAT BULL**** YOU THINK YOU KNOW ABOUT ME
(2007).
12
See Christina Patracuolla, Anna Cladakis, John Daly’s Fiancée: 5 Fast Facts
You Need to Know, HEAVY (July 17, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://heavy.com/sports/2015
/07/anna-cladakis-john-dalys-fiancee-ex-wife-divorce-suing-affair-married-girlfriend
(last updated July 8, 2016).
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girlfriend, Anna Cladakis, became engaged in December 2014.13
Daly, now with Cladakis by his side as caddie and fashion
double,14 continues to live large.15 As the hallmarks of Tunica,
Mississippi—eating, drinking, smoking and gambling—are also
self-proclaimed hallmarks of Daly.16 One would not be surprised
to learn that he has, on occasion, visited Tunica, Mississippi for
recreation. The casual intersection of John Daly, his girfriend
and Tunica provides a litigious lens through which the exercise of
long-arm jurisdiction by one state over residents of another state
must be examined.17
B.

Romance on the Road

Despite an estimated $90 million in gambling losses between
1991 and 2007,18 John Daly owns an impressive tour bus.19 Daly
considers his Prevost RV to be his “home away from home.”20
These days one might find him in Augusta, Georgia, not on the
golf course as in his glory days, but rather, hawking his
merchandise from his tour bus parked in front of the Augusta
Hooters.21 Allegedly, such a tour bus provided the situs in 2007
13
See Micah Peters, John Daly Got Engaged to His Girlfriend of Seven Years,
USA TODAY: FTW GOLF (Dec. 5, 2014, 5:14 PM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2014/12/
john-daly-engaged-girlfriend-seven-years.
14
Daly has an endorsement contract with Loudmouth Golf whose bold and
garish clothing line has “proven to be a perfect fit for John Daly—and girlfriend
Anna Cladakis.” “Bad Golf Style” Lives with Loudmouth, Daly, PGA TOUR: FASHION
INSIDER (Oct. 27, 2010), www.pgatour.com/news/2010/10/27/fashion-insider.html.
15
Luke Kerr-Dineen, Breaking: John Daly Is on Snapchat (Mar. 23, 2016, 11:12
AM),
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/03/john-daly-is-on-snapchat-brace-yours
elves-people (“John Daly announced that he is . . . letting us take a glimpse of his
crazy-pants wearing, chain-smoking, Hooters food-eating, diet coke-drinking, clubthrowing, Donald Trump-supporting, ‘wild thing’ lifestyle.”).
16
John Daly, supra note 5 (“Everyone has addictions and my problem is that I
have 5,000 of them. If it’s not drinking, it’s gambling; if it’s not gambling, it’s eating
anything from burgers, doughnuts to M&Ms. The only addiction I don’t suffer from
is chasing women.”).
17
Long-arm jurisdiction is achieved through a state’s long-arm statute which is
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary to be “[a] statute providing for jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who has had contacts with the territory where the statute is
in effect. Most state long-arm statutes extend this jurisdiction to its constitutional
limits.” Long-Arm Statute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
18
Phillips Erb, supra note 6.
19
See Take a Look Inside John Daly's RV Parked in Front of the Augusta
Hooters, GOLF, http://www.golf.com/video/tour-john-dalys-rv-parked-outside-augusta
-hooters (last visited June 25, 2017).
20
Id.
21
Id.

4

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1

and 2008 for Daly and girlfriend Anna Cladakis to engage in the
type of behavior in which professional athletes and the beautiful
women surrounding them often engage.22
Imagine a 39-year-old Cladakis employed as a promotional
director for Hooters meeting John Daly through his endorsement
contract with Hooters.23 Imagine further that in 2007 Cladakis
travels from her home state of Florida to Memphis, Tennessee for
a social visit with Daly.24 While in Memphis, the separated but
still legally married Daly and Cladakis hop onto Daly’s tour bus
for a short drive.25
Memphis is situated in the southwest corner of Tennessee.26
Daly could have driven the tour bus 30 minutes east or north and
remained within the state of Tennessee. Alternatively, Daly
could have driven 30 minutes west of Memphis to the state of
Arkansas. Within either Tennessee or Arkansas, Cladakis’s
alleged tour bus tryst with a married man would not have given
rise to a cause of action in tort.27 However, Daly drove 30
minutes south to the gambling and entertainment town of
Tunica, Mississippi. Travel in this direction—and only in this
direction—opened the door to a lawsuit by Daly’s then wife
against Daly’s companion on the tour bus.28 Notwithstanding the
22
Miller v. Provident Adver. & Mktg., Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 188 n.4 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2862 (2015). Ironically, Daly’s tour bus is not the
first RV to feature prominently in heart balm litigation. In 1997, Suzanne Barkes
sued her former fiancé Dr. Alvin D. Gilbert for breach of promise to marry after his
former lover showed up at the motor home in which Barkes and Gilbert were
vacationing. Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1999); see also Jane Van Ryan,
Hazen v. Scharringhaus and Barkes v. Gilbert, MABRY–HAZEN HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.mabryhazen.com/news/2016/1/4/hazen-v-scharringhaus-and-barkes-vgilbert.
23
Peters, supra note 13.
24
Miller, 155 So. 3d at 185.
25
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, John Daly Love Triangle May Be Headed to Supreme
Court, N.Y. POST (May 12, 2015, 11:03 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/05/12/john
-daly-love-triangle-may-be-headed-to-supreme-court/.
26
Where Is Memphis, Tennessee?, WORLDATLAS, http://www.worldatlas.com/na/
us/tn/where-is-memphis.html (last visited June 25, 2017).
27
As of 2007, neither Tennessee nor Arkansas recognized the torts of alienation
of affections or criminal conversation, Tennessee having abolished them in 1989 and
1991, respectively, and Arkansas having abolished them in 1989. See infra note 35.
See also infra Part III for a discussion of these torts.
28
Mississippi is one of only a handful of states which provides legal recourse to
a brokenhearted plaintiff whose spouse’s affections have been alienated by the
wrongful acts of another. See Sheri Stritof, Alienation of Affection State Laws,
ABOUT: MARRIAGE (Dec. 25, 2015), http://marriage.about.com/od/legalities/a/
alienation.htm.
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insignificant amount of time and money Cladakis spent in the
state of Mississippi, her lack of assets, and business interests in
the state,29 her crossing across the state line into the
jurisdictional reach of Mississippi’s long-arm statute set the
stage for Part II: Mississippi Provides a Remedy.30
II. MISSISSIPPI PROVIDES A REMEDY
On February 19, 2010, the almost nine-year marriage of
Sherrie Miller and John Daly ended with a Tennessee divorce.31
Consistent with Tennessee law, the divorce court presumably32
distributed marital property equitably,33 made provisions for the
child of the marriage,34 and severed the parties’ legal status as
husband and wife. The Tennessee court was, however, impotent
to offer additional financial salve for Sherrie Miller’s wounded
heart, as the public policy of Tennessee no longer embraced the
amatory torts35 of alienation of affections36 and criminal

29
The amount of time and money spent within a state, as well as property
owned or business ventures conducted within a state, are factors supporting whether
an individual has purposefully established minimum contacts with a state necessary
for the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over the individual without offending
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
30
See infra note 42.
31
This was Daly’s fourth divorce. See Patracuolla, supra note 12.
32
Terms of the divorce are not publicly available as the case is under seal.
33
Tennessee is an equitable division state. Fault is not a factor in the equitable
division of property. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (West, Westlaw through 2017
1st Reg. Sess.). Some practitioners, however, contend that marital fault such as
adultery may indirectly affect the judge’s discretion to award more property to the
innocent spouse. See Grounds for Divorce in Tennessee FAQ’s, MILES MASON LAW
FIRM, http://memphisdivorce.com/grounds-for-divorce-in-tennessee-faqs/ (last visited
June 25, 2017).
34
The Tennessee Child Support Guidelines are found at TENN. CODE ANN. § 365-101. Miller and Daly have one son together. Patracuolla, supra note 12.
35
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-701 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.)
(legislatively abolishing alienation of affections in Tennessee); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-508 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.) (legislatively abolishing
criminal conversation).
36
David M. Cotter, The Well-Deserved Erosion of the Tort of Alienation of
Affections and the Potential Liability of Nonresident Defendants, 15 No. 12 DIVORCE
LITIG. 204 (2003) (“The essential elements of alienation of affections are as follows:
(1) The existence of a valid marriage at the time the alienation occurred;
(2) Wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant; (3) An injury to the innocent
spouse demonstrated by the loss of affection or consortium; and (4) A causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the innocent spouse’s loss.”).
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conversation.37 In 1991, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared
that such amatory torts “ha[d] no place in contemporary society,
because the social harm [caused] far outweighs any justification
for [their] existence . . . .”38 Dissatisfied with the public policy of
her home state, Miller filed a complaint for alienation of affection
and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Anna
Cladakis in the DeSoto County Mississippi Circuit Court.39
Miller filed her complaint on February 25, 2011, a full year after
Miller’s divorce from Daly, alleging that Cladakis’s wrongful and
inappropriate contact with Daly caused the breakdown of Miller’s
marriage to Daly which, in turn, caused Miller to suffer loss of
society, companionship with Daly, and loss of sexual relations.40
The enumerated acts of Cladakis’s wrongful conduct comprise
cell phone calls and text messages to Daly and two dates on
which Cladakis and Daly allegedly engaged in sexual conduct
while on Daly’s tour bus parked in Mississippi.41 The hook on
which Miller relied to establish a claim of alienation of affections
under Mississippi law was the reach of the Mississippi long-arm
statute, which provides as follows:
Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited partnership, or
any foreign or other corporation not qualified under the
Constitution and laws of this state as to doing business herein,
who shall make a contract with a resident of this state to be
performed in whole or in part by any party in this state, or who
shall commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a
resident or nonresident of this state, or who shall do any
business or perform any character of work or service in this
state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business
in Mississippi and shall thereby be subjected to the jurisdiction

37
Shauna M. Deans, Comment: The Forgotten Side of the Battlefield in
America’s War on Infidelity: A Call for the Revamping, Reviving, and Reworking of
Criminal Conversation and Alienation of Affections, 53 HOW. L.J. 377, 393 (2010)
(“The elements of criminal conversation, despite slight variance among different
jurisdictions and time periods, generally included: (1) proof of a valid marriage; (2) a
third party’s adulterous intercourse with the plaintiff’s spouse; and (3) damages.”).
38
Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Tenn. 1991).
39
Miller v. Provident Advert. & Mktg. Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 185 (Miss Ct. App.
2014).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 188 n.4; see also id. at 186–87 (noting that “[o]n February 27, 2012,
Miller moved to file a second amended complaint, which would have given two
specific dates [of January 1, 2007, and April 13, 2008] of the alleged sexual and/or
improper conduct . . . .”).
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of the courts of this state. Service of summons and process upon
the defendant shall be had or made as is provided by the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.42

Though the trial court of Mississippi dismissed Miller’s claim
for lack of personal jurisdiction over nonresident Cladakis,43 the
Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Miller had
established a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction pursuant
to the Mississippi long-arm statute44 by alleging that Cladakis
had committed a tort “in whole or in part in
[Mississippi] . . . against
a . . . nonresident
of
this
state . . . [which] subjected [Cladakis] to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state.”45 Having established personal jurisdiction
in a state recognizing as tortious the alienation by another of
one’s spouse’s affections,46 Miller was situated to proceed to trial
seeking money damages against Cladakis under Mississippi
law.47 Through application of the tort prong of the Mississippi
long-arm statute,48 “a Tennessee resident took advantage of
Mississippi’s long-arm statute to sue a Florida resident for
alienation of affection—a cause of action not recognized in
Tennessee.”49 It is interesting to note that both alienation of
affections and criminal conversation were recognized in
Mississippi until 199250 at which time criminal conversation—
which allowed a plaintiff to recover in tort against a third party
for adultery with plaintiff’s spouse—was jettisoned by

42
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)
(emphasis added).
43
Miller, 155 So. 3d at 187.
44
Id. at 191.
45
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
46
Alienation of affections is recognized in Mississippi as a valid cause of action
against a paramour to remedy intentional conduct that causes a spouse to suffer loss
and injury to her marital relationship. Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1020
(Miss. 2007), reh’g denied, July 26, 2007.
47
In an action for alienation of affections, jury awards of punitive and actual
damages may be substantial. See, e.g., id. at 1030 (upholding a punitive damages
award for $112,500 and actual damages award of $642,000).
48
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
49
The terminology employed by Judge Maxwell in Waldrup v. Eads, 180 So. 3d
820, 829 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added), is both noteworthy and accurate.
Barred from suing in Tennessee, Miller opportunistically filed suit in Mississippi
just prior to the running of the three statute of limitations imposed by MISS. CODE
ANN. § 15-1-49 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
50
David Neil McCarty, Love in Vain: The Social Value of Mississippi’s
Alienation of Affection in Protecting Marriage, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 107, 111 (2012).
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Mississippi51 consistent with the national trend of states’
disfavoring the heart balm torts.52 Once criminal conversation
was abolished, Mississippi was “left with one arrow in its quiver
Mississippi
to protect marriage: alienation of affection.”53
continues to vehemently adhere to this morality tort as necessary
protection of the values which underscore marriage.54 Even as
other states reject the antiquated and ineffective “arrows” of the
amatory torts, Mississippi is sharpening its arrow, and providing
a shooting range for brokenhearted residents and nonresidents
alike.55
III. HISTORY OF HEART BALM
In order to understand Mississippi’s judicial devotion to—
and interstate peddling of—the tort of alienation of affections,
one must examine the ebb and flow of the popularity of the heart
balm56 torts and their perceived necessity57—or utter
worthlessness58—for vindicating a broken heart.59 At common
law, a man’s legal remedies were embodied in two distinct torts:
alienation of affections and criminal conversation, both offering
redress against the third-party male interloper on the marriage
51
Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 1214, 1214 (Miss. 1992) (holding that the tort
of criminal conversation was no longer a viable tort in Mississippi).
52
See infra Section III.B.
53
McCarty, supra note 50, at 111.
54
Jamie Heard, Comment, The National Trend of Abolishing Actions for the
Alienation of a Spouse’s Affection and Mississippi’s Refusal to Follow Suit, 28 MISS.
C. L. REV. 313, 331 (2009) (“Refusing to abolish the tort, the court stated that it
‘believe[s] that the marital relationship is an important element in the foundation of
out [sic] society [and t]o abolish the tort of alienation of affection would, in essence,
send the message that [the court is] devaluing the marriage relationship.’ ” (citing
Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414, 418 (Miss. 1999))).
55
The Mississippi Court of Appeals noted that Miller “lack[ed] a viable
alternative forum to adjudicate [her] claim, since both Tennessee and Florida have
abolished alienation-of-affection as a cause of action. This fact increases
Mississippi’s interest in adjudicating this claim.” Miller, 155 So. 3d at 194.
56
Heart balm is a euphemistic label conveying, perhaps derisively, that the
money judgment award in tort will serve as salve for the broken hearted plaintiff.
57
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 629 (1st ed. 1956) (“Particularly in
alienation, grievous wrongs are suffered and some of life’s most important interests
ruthlessly invaded. To abolish all remedy in such cases is certainly subject to serious
questions.”).
58
Deana Pollard Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1055
(2008) (claiming that “contemporary jurisprudence reflects the view that a broken
heart is not actionable . . . .”).
59
See BEVERLY, MELDRUM & BLACK, TENNESSEE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
(forthcoming 2017), for a discussion of the history of heart balm torts.
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relationship.60
Historically, these morality torts were not
available to wives as men and women were not equal players
under the law,61 and within domestic relations law, the pattern
was clear: Women were legally dependent appendages to their
legally dominant male, whether father or husband.62 Consistent
with the notion that women were appendages to their legally
dominant male, the common law provided two remedies to the
man, either the father or the spouse, whose woman, either wife
or daughter, was compromised by the intentional, wrongful
affections of a third party.63
The specific elements establishing an action for alienation of
affections may vary; however, in general, the plaintiff must show
the existence of a marriage with love and affection between the
plaintiff and his spouse, wrongful actions by another directed to
the plaintiff’s spouse, and a causal link between those wrongful
actions and a breakdown in the marriage.64 Alienation of
affections has also carried the descriptive moniker “enticement”65
and seeks to redress the various losses—financial and intimate—
suffered by a husband whose wife is enticed away from him by
the wrongful (and often sexual) advances of another.66

60
The heart balm torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation
evolved from the English common law actions for enticement and seduction,
respectively. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 124 (5th ed. 1984).
61
Sacks, supra note 58, at 1056 (noting that the heart balm torts “were
dismantled to a large degree in recognition of their propensity to perpetrate
antifeminist sexual stereotypes, which may cause social harm per se.”).
62
See Women and the Law, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL: WOMEN, ENTERPRISE
& SOCIETY, http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/wes/collections/women_law (last visited
June 25, 2017), (explaining that historic “marriage and property laws, or ‘coverture,’
stipulated that a married woman did not have a separate legal existence from her
husband. A married woman . . . was a dependent, like an underage child or a slave,
and could not own property in her own name or control her own earnings, except
under very specific circumstances. When a husband died, his wife could not be the
guardian to their under-age children.”); see also Sacks, supra note 58, at 1058
(noting that seduction, the precursor to criminal conversation, remedied the
economic harm to a woman’s father’s property interest in her and that enticement,
the precursor to alienation of affections, redressed the economic harm of a husband).
63
Donnell v. Donnell, 415 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tenn. 1967).
64
See Cotter, supra note 36.
65
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 124.
66
Proof of sexual contact between the defendant and the plaintiff’s wife is not
required to establish the tort of alienation of affections. KEETON ET AL., supra note
60, § 124 (“[I]t is not necessary to show adultery or that the plaintiff spouse has been
deprived of any household services or has suffered any pecuniary loss.”).
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Criminal conversation is similar to the tort of alienation of
affections; however, it requires proof of actual adulterous contact
between the suitor and the plaintiff’s spouse.67 Historically,
criminal conversation compensates the plaintiff for the resulting
devaluing of his wife at the hands or perhaps by the hands of the
defendant.68 The moniker “criminal conversation” is reminiscent
of chapter four of Genesis in which Adam “knew” Eve and she
conceived a child.69 Both linguistic usages disguise the act: “sex
plain and simple.”70
The final heart balm tort, breach of promise to marry, began
as “a popular means of soothing the sufferings of rejected love.”71
The common law offered this remedy to the woman whose suitor
breached the pillars of social propriety by failing to commit to
her, resulting in the nonoccurrence of her desired marriage. A
woman’s economic opportunity cost of engagement or marriage to
one man was the foreclosure of attaining wife status with any
other. Consequently, where the promise to marry was not
fulfilled, the common law provided a paternalistic economic
redress for the dashed hopes, tarnished reputation and decreased
future economic prospects of the rejected woman. The redress
was in the nature of a breach of contract action against the
fiancé. While the breach of promise to marry cause of action
remains in many states,72 the modern embodiments of this cause
of action require an actual contract to marry either evidenced by
a written promise or proven by the testimony of two disinterested
witnesses,73 and may limit damages to actual damages proven.74
67

See Deans, supra note 37, at 393.
The euphemistically named tort was formerly known as seduction. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 124.
69
Genesis 4:1 (King James).
70
Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal Price of Adultery
Goes Down: North Carolina and West Virginia Abandon Heartbalm Actions,
VERDICT: LEGAL ANALYSIS & COMMENT. FROM JUSTIA (June 24, 2014),
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/06/24/legal-price-adultery-goes/.
71
See, e.g., Rivkin v. Postal, No. M1999-01947-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1077952,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2001) (quoting Homer H. Clark Jr., The Law of
Domestic Relations in the United States § 1.1 (2d ed. 1987)).
72
About half of the states recognize a limited right of action under the theory of
breach of promise to marry. See Neil G. Williams, What To Do When There’s No “I
Do”: A Model for Awarding Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV.
1019, 1020–21 (1995).
73
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-401 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg.
Sess.).
74
See, e.g., id. § 36-3-404 (Westlaw).
68
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With time, the heart balm torts were modernized to provide
a gender-neutral remedy to either a man or a woman whose
promised marriage was not solemnized or whose solemnized
marriage was sacrificed to the affections of another. As the heart
balm torts comprise three distinct causes of action, a state may
embrace them all, reject them all or find one or two to be
consistent with the state’s public policy while rejecting the
other(s).75 Tennessee still recognizes the tort of breach of
promise to marry;76 the other amatory torts, however, have been
scrutinized, criticized and abolished by the courts and lawmakers
in Tennessee.77 While the salacious fact patterns underlying the
amatory torts may present sympathetic would-be plaintiffs,78 the
public policy repudiating recovery in tort for alienation of
affections and criminal conversation is absent any ambiguity for
Tennesseans and their marriages, as the following cases
demonstrate.79
A.

Two Tennessee Tortfeasors

Loyalty is expected from one’s spouse and one’s business
partner; Walter A. Dupius was betrayed by both. In 1986 Mr.
Dupuis filed an action for alienation of affections against his
close friend and business partner Charles Hand for engaging in a
three-year affair with Mr. Dupuis’ wife,80 which affair resulted in
both the demise of Mr. Dupuis’ marriage and his business

75
Significantly more than the other amatory torts, the tort of breach of promise
to marry has survived scrutiny and remained a cause of action in roughly half of the
states as of 1995. See Williams, supra note 72, at 1020–21.
76
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-401 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.).
77
See id. § 36-3-701; id. § 39-13-508 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg.
Sess.).
78
See, e.g., Heck v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464, 465 (Ill. 1946) (compensating a
husband whose wife participated in an illicit affair while her husband was
hospitalized); Scharringhaus v. Hazen, 107 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1937)
(compensating a jilted socialite $80,000 for her fiancé’s failure to marry her after a
15-year engagement); Archer v. Archer, 219 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947)
(finding for the plaintiff, as defendant “did by feminine wiles and guile incite and
welcome the attentions of [plaintiff’s] husband”); see also Murphy v. Colson, 999
N.E.2d 372, 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (redressing a father of six whose wife ran off
with her cross fit trainer); Miss Hazen’s Courtship in Court, LAWSON MCGHEE
LIBRARY (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.knoxlib.org/about/news-and-publications/pod
casts/historic-knoxville-news-podcast/miss-hazens-courtship-court.
79
See Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 893 (Tenn. 1991); see also infra notes
90–91.
80
Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tenn. 1991).
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ventures.81 Following a convoluted procedural history through
the Court of Appeals, in 1991 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant, Mr. Hand, and judicially abolished the common
law action for alienation of affections in Tennessee.82 The
common law tort of alienation of affections had been abolished by
the General Assembly of Tennessee as of July 1, 1989.83
However, the court found that the Tennessee General Assembly
lacked the authority to enact a law which retroactively changed
Mr. Dupuis’ vested common law right in his previously filed
alienation of affections case.84
A second case decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
1991 addressed alienation of affections, criminal conversation
and medical malpractice when a prominent gynecologist in
Memphis was sued by the husband of a patient.85 In 1983, Dr.
Robert M. Ruch and his patient Sandra Hanover began a two
year affair notwithstanding Mrs. Hanover’s then twenty-nineyear marriage to Jerome Hanover.86 At trial, the jury found that
Dr. Ruch had committed the tort of criminal conversation and
awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Mr. Hanover in
the amount of $125,000.87 On Dr. Ruch’s appeal, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals recommended the abolishment of criminal
conversation, but noted its lack of authority to do so.88 The
Tennessee Supreme Court, however, relying on precedent
establishing retroactive application of judicial changes to the
common law, declared the tort of criminal conversation to be
obsolete and abolished it under Tennessee law.89

81

Dupuis v. Dupuis, 1988 WL 74620, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 1988).
Hand, 814 S.W.2d at 341.
83
1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts 517.
84
Hand, 814 S.W.2d at 343.
85
Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 893 (Tenn. 1991) (“The defendant, Robert
M. Ruch, M.D., is a gynecologist. The plaintiff is Jerome Hanover, whose wife,
Sandra Hanover, was Dr. Ruch's patient.”). The affair between the doctor and Mrs.
Hanover lasted for two years, at which point Mr. Hanover sued his wife for a divorce
and filed a “civil complaint against Dr. Ruch, alleging three causes of action:
criminal conversation, alienation of affections, and medical malpractice.” Id.
86
Id. at 893.
87
Id. The tort of alienation of affections had just been retroactively abolished in
Hand, 814 S.W.2d at 341.
88
Hanover, 809 S.W.2d at 893.
89
Id. at 898.
82
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The holdings in Dupuis and Hanover contain diatribes
against the evils underscoring and the harms promulgated by the
heart balm torts of alienation of affections and criminal
conversation.90 Having abolished the torts both legislatively and
judicially, the lawmakers and judges of Tennessee have clearly
articulated the public policy of Tennessee against these
antiquated amatory remedies.91
B.

The Nearly Universal Demise of Morality Torts: Antiquated
Paradigms and Outdated Actions92

Tennessee was neither the first nor the most recent
jurisdiction to recant on the desirability of the heart balm torts.93
In fact, the amatory torts have “come and gone in most
jurisdictions.”94 Beginning in the mid-1930s the legislatures of
several states including Alabama,95 California,96 Colorado,97
Illinois,98 Indiana,99 New Jersey,100 and New York101 targeted the
common law torts of alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, and breach of promise to marry.102 The sudden
enactment by these various state legislatures of Heart Balm
90
Alienation of affections “diminishes human dignity, demeans the participants,
inflicts pain upon the innocent, and does not prevent human misconduct.” Id.
(quoting Lentz v. Baker, 792 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).
91
Id. (“[T]he public policy of the state, as expressed by the Legislature, is
offended by criminal conversation actions . . . .”).
92
“When the reason for a rule of law disappears, so to [sic] should the rule.”
Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Mo. 2003) (first citing Thomas v. Siddiqui,
869 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Mo. 1994) (en banc); and then citing State ex inf. Norman v.
Ellis, 28 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Mo. 1930)).
93
In 2009, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court disavowed the tort of alienation of
affections. Matthew v. Herman, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2009-0074, 2012 WL 1965891, at *5
(V.I. May 15, 2012).
94
Marshall Davidson, Comment, Stealing Love in Tennessee: The Thief Goes
Free, 56 TENN. L. REV. 629, 629 (1989).
95
ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
96
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.).
97
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the
71st Gen. Assemb.).
98
See ch. 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 246.1, 246.2 (West 1943). The Illinois Heart
Balm Act was found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Heck
v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464, 465–66 (Ill. 1946).
99
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-2-1 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the
120th Gen. Assemb.).
100
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (LEXIS through 217th 2d Annual Sess.).
101
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney 2016).
102
N. P. Feinsinger, Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry,
Alienation of Affections, and Related Actions, 10 WIS. L. REV. 417, 417 (1935).
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Acts—perhaps better named Anti-Heart Balm Acts as they
abolished the common law heart balm torts—evidenced “the
wave of agitation” with the common law torts.103 The verbose
verbiage104 of New York’s noteworthy legislation is illuminating:
“The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of
actions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, having
been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance,
embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many
persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were
merely the victims of circumstances, and such remedies having
been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust
enrichment, and such remedies having furnished vehicles for
the commission or attempted commission of crime and in many
cases having resulted in the perpetuation of frauds, it is hereby
declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests
of the people of the state will be served by the abolition of such
remedies.”105

While courts throughout the United States had until then
almost uniformly embraced the desirability of the common law
torts,106 the sweep of Heart Balm Acts through the state
legislatures reflected a legislative perspective that “the courts
were suffering from precedent paralysis, and were not awake to
social realities.”107 The gradual acceptance of gender equality
and sexual freedom fostered a gradual rejection of possessory
descriptions of the relationship between lovers; consequently, the
heart balm torts were seen by most states as the very antithesis
of the modern public policy underlying the state’s domestic
relations laws.108 The repudiation of the common law remedies
represented a relaxing of the social rigidity of the concept and

103

Frederick L. Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 63

(1936).
104
The redundancy in the phrase “verbose verbiage” is intentional as the author
contends that neither verbosity nor verbiage standing alone is sufficient to capture
New York State’s legislative pronouncement of the public policy of the state in N.Y.
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 61(a) (McKinney 2016).
105
Id.
106
Alaska never embraced the heart balm torts. Harris v. Dragseth, No. S–5502,
1994 WL 16459435, at *3 (Alaska Oct. 5, 1994).
107
Kane, supra note 103, at 70.
108
Sacks, supra note 58, at 1060–61 (noting that the heart balm remedies were
“antithetical to gender equality and women’s self–determination”).
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function of the family as well as an embracing of “increased
freedom of association between each spouse and the outside
world.”109
A second wave of legislative attack on the heart balm torts
accompanied the rapid social change of the 1960’s.110 During the
1980’s and 1990’s, disdain for the heart balm torts moved from
the legislative assemblies to the courthouses.111 When the
Supreme Court of Missouri abolished alienation of affections as
recently as 2003, the court acknowledged the changed social
parameters, paradigms and expectations within intimate
relationships noting that such changes require modification to
antiquated rules of law.112
Whether the abuses of the heart balm torts were ubiquitous
or merely the result of a few isolated but well publicized cases of
infidelity is largely irrelevant.113 The fact remains that “the
amatory torts [fell] victim to the legal equivalent of a ‘perfect
storm.’ ”114 Widespread disapproval of the torts was penned by
legislative bodies115 and judicial clerks alike,116 noting that
modern public policy is offended by the tort of alienation of
109
Kane, supra note 103, at 71–72 (citing Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative
Attack on “Heart Balm,” 33 MICH. L. REV. 979, 1009 (1935)).
110
The following states legislatively abolished the tort of alienation of affections
during the 1960’s: Connecticut by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572b (LEXIS through
Pub. Acts 1–7 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); Delaware, rejected in tort by DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 3924 (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2017, chs. 1–20); Michigan by MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2901 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. of the 99th
Leg.); Montana by MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-601 (LEXIS through 2017 Reg. Sess. of
the 65th Leg.); West Virginia by W.VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (West, Westlaw through 2017
Reg. Sess.).
111
The following states abolished alienation of affections by judicial
proclamation: Idaho by O’Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986); Iowa
by Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981); Kentucky by Hoye
v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Ky. 1992); South Dakota by Hunt v. Hunt, 309
N.W.2d 818, 819 (S.D. 1981); Washington by Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452, 455
(Wash. 1980).
112
Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 232 (Mo. 2003) (citing Thomas v.
Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Mo. 1994).
113
See Harold V. Dixon, Penal Provisions of the New “Heart Balm” Legislation,
10 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 236, 239 (1936) (noting that local media coverage of the Heart
Balm Acts in the mid 1930’s focused on misuse of the morality torts).
114
Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 362–63 (2008).
115
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.01 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.
and 1st Spec. Sess.).
116
See, e.g., Wyman v. Wallace, 549 P.2d 71, 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976), aff’d 615
P.2d 452 (1980) (stating that an action for alienation of affections “diminishes
human dignity”).
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affections.117 Most legislative repudiations of the heart balm
torts were accompanied by vitriolic proclamations of that state’s
public policy.118 The death of the heart balm torts in some states,
by contrast, came quietly, as the state had made little or no use
of the common law causes of action.119
By 2000, all but seven states had repudiated the legal and
social foundations underpinning the tort of alienation of
affections.120 Even within those seven states, the decline of the
heart balm torts can be seen in the paucity of cases,121 the
lukewarm122 or even negative dicta of state courts,123 and state
117
See, e.g., Young v. Young, 184 So. 187, 190 (Ala. 1938); Rotwein v. Gersten,
36 So.2d 419, 420 (Fla. 1948); Quinn v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 336 (Mass. App. Ct.
2000); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 395 A.2d 913, 918 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
118
See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.) (abolishing the tort of alienation of affection) (“[T]he enforcement of the action
for alienation of affections has been subjected to grave abuses and has been used as
an instrument for blackmail by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment,
due to the indefiniteness of the damages recoverable in such actions . . . . It is also
hereby declared that the award of monetary damages in such actions is ineffective as
a recompense for genuine mental or emotional distress.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.01
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.) (“[A]ctions based upon
alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of
contract to marry, have been subject to grave abuses, have caused intimidation and
harassment, to innocent persons and have resulted in the perpetration of frauds. It
is declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the
state will be served by the abolition of these causes of action.”).
119
There are only two reported cases of alienation of affections in New
Hampshire, one in 1970 in which a husband sued his wife’s lover whose name,
ironically, was Romeo. See Dube v. Rochette, 262 A.2d 288, 289 (N.H. 1970); see also
Duval v. Wiggin, 474 A.2d 1002, 1005 (N.H. 1984). Alienation of affections was
abolished by the New Hampshire legislature in 1981. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
120
In 2016, alienation of affections is a recognized tort in only six states:
Hawaii, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota and Utah. Having
legislatively repealed alienation of affections in 1935 with passage of the Heart Balm
Act, the Supreme Court of Illinois reinstated the tort in 1946 in Heck v. Schupp, 68
N.E.2d 464 (Ill. 1946), but the legislature later repealed it again on January 1, 2016.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/7.1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). In that
case, Mr. Heck claimed that before he joined the army, he and his wife, Henrietta,
enjoyed a happy, loving marriage. Heck, 68 N.E.2d at 465. Mr. Heck sued
Henrietta’s lover, Mr. Schupp, for the tort of alienation of affections after Mr.
Schupp “wantonly and maliciously destroyed and alienated . . . the affection of the
said Henrietta” while Mr. Heck was deployed. Id.
121
The only reported case of alienation of affections in Hawaii is Waki v.
Yamada, 26 Haw. 52, 53 (Haw. 1921) in which the Supreme Court of Hawaii upheld
the dismissal of an action for enticement, the legal precursor to alienation of
affections. See Hunt v. Chang, 594 P.2d 118, 123 (Haw. 1979).
122
While alienation of affections remains a common law cause of action in New
Mexico, the Court of Appeals has expressed its disfavor of the tort in Padwa v.
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statutes limiting alienation of affections to a mere shadow of its
former common law embodiment.124 In some states alienation of
affection has survived direct appeals to abolish the tort by a
minority of the state’s Supreme Court judges.125
The rejection of the heart balm tort of alienation of affections
by the vast majority of states represents a paradigm shift in
family law. Only two states, Mississippi126 and North Carolina,127
have refused to “[t]hrow out these claims into the ashbin of
history” and instead continue to enthusiastically entertain
modern actions for the wounded of heart.128 Recent judicial
opinions from each of Mississippi129 and North Carolina,130
however, might foreshadow a reeling in of the availability of
alienation of affections as a tort remedy against nonresident
defendants.

Hadley, 981 P.2d 1234, 1240 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). Noting that the Supreme Court of
South Dakota was not a “legislative overlord,” that court deferred to the state’s
statutorily based tort of alienation of affections in affirming a $265,000 jury award
to a husband whose wife had engaged in sexual relations with her supervisor. See
Veeder v. Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610, 616 (S.D. 1999).
123
See Coulter v. Renshaw, 418 N.E.2d 489, 490 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“Not only
have alienation of affection actions been limited sharply by statute in Illinois, they
also have been subject to close and strict judicial scrutiny within very narrow limits
both in pleading and proof.”); see also Feldman v. Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 34 (N.H.
1984).
124
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2 provides, “No damages shall be allowed to
either spouse in any action based on alienation of the affections of the other spouse.”
This statute effectively abolished alienation of affections in New Hampshire.
Damages for alienation of affections actions in Illinois are statutorily limited to
actual damages per ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1901–07 (repealed 2016). Causes of
action brought before the repeal may still stand as valid. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/7.1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
125
See, e.g., Veeder, 589 N.W.2d at 616 (S.D. 1999) (holding that public policy
does not require the abolition of the statutorily-derived tort of alienation of
affections); see also Michele Crissman, Note, Alienation of Affections: An Ancient
Tort—But Still Alive in South Dakota, 48 S.D. L. REV. 518, 537–38 (2003).
126
Miller v. Provident Advert. and Mktg., 155 So. 3d 181, 185 (Miss. Ct. App.
2014).
127
See generally, Jean M. Cary & Sharon Scudder, Breaking Up is Hard To Do:
North Carolina Refuses to End its Relationship with Heart Balm Torts, 4 ELON L.
REV. 1, 2 (2012).
128
Grossman & Friedman, supra note 70.
129
Nordness v. Faucheux, 170 So. 3d 454, 456 (Miss. 2015).
130
Rothrock v. Cooke, No. 14CVS870, 2014 WL 2973066, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct.
June 11, 2014). (holding North Carolina’s action for alienation of affections to be
unconstitutional as it “explicitly seeks to punish the expression of friendliness,
affection or intimacy by consenting parties . . . .”).
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IV. HEART BALM’S THREAT TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Residents of one state often interact with residents of sister
states or with the sister state itself. If, however, an individual is
to become a defendant in a sister state, that state must establish
personal jurisdiction over the individual. A state’s exercise of
jurisdiction over an out-of-state tortfeasor requires conduct by
the defendant which links the defendant to that state. In a torts
action these links, called minimum contacts, focus upon the
relationship between the defendant, the state and the elements
of the underlying tort.131
The forum state’s hook by which it pulls nonresidents into
the embrace of its laws is the forum state’s long-arm statute. An
expansive long-arm statute might provide that the commission of
all or part of a tort within the state is a sufficient link to the state
to require a nonresident tortfeasor to defend a lawsuit within
that state.132
The commission of wrongful acts which alienate a married
individual from his spouse fails to be a tort in most states.133
However, if the wrongful acts occur within one of the few states
still upholding the tort of alienation of affections,134 these tortious
contacts within the state trigger the state’s jurisdiction over a
nonresident tortfeasor.135 Undoubtedly, in self-preservation of its
own public policy and protection against the infringement upon
its residents’ rights, each state will seek to extend its long-arm
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in tort actions brought
by state residents. However, in tort actions brought by a
nonresident against another nonresident, the dual rationales of
public policy preservation and vindication of residents’ rights are
missing, making the broad exercise of long-arm jurisdiction
131

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.) (emphasis added).
133
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/7.1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.).
134
See supra, note 120.
135
David Neil McCarty, a Mississippi lawyer, foresaw this very problem:
“Knight is a resounding statement of support for the tort of alienation of
affection. Not only will the tort survive in Mississippi under this reasoning,
but persons from other states and countries would be well-advised to use
caution because the state has a unique interest in protecting the
relationships of its citizens.”
McCarty, supra note 50, at 117; see also Knight v. Woodfield, 50 So. 3d 995, 997
(Miss. 2011).
132
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constitutionally tenuous. Importantly, due process demands that
even when minimum contacts exist, a state’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant must not violate the
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.136
A.

Mississippi’s Very Long-Arm and the Dilution of Minimum
Contacts

A basic tenet of state sovereignty demands that one state’s
recognition of a legal remedy and its provision of a forum to its
residents to pursue such remedy is not dependent upon the
inclination of sister states to do likewise.137
There is no
mandatory uniformity from state to state within family law.138
While there may have been substantial commonality of legal
principles among the states under early family law
jurisprudence,139 the evolution of legal norms has progressed at
different rates from state to state.140 Meanwhile, some states
136

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
Sovereignty, THE LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreediction
ary.com/sovereignty (last visited June 25, 2017) (“Sovereignty is the power of a state
to do everything necessary to govern itself, such as making, executing and applying
laws . . . .”).
138
See infra Section V.B. (discussing Uniform Laws).
139
For example, early divorces in the United States required a showing of fault.
The earliest record of divorces in the United States come from the Colony of
Massachusetts Bay, where a special tribunal was formed in 1629 to hear divorce
matters. The grounds for divorce were fault-based: adultery, bigamy, desertion, and
impotence. The History of Divorce Law in the USA, HISTORY COOPERATIVE: A SHORT
HISTORY OF NEARLY EVERYTHING, http://historycooperative.org/the-history-ofdivorce-law-in-the-usa/ (last visited June 25, 2017). The first divorce in the United
States was granted in Massachusetts Bay in 1639 to Mrs. James Luxford on the
grounds of bigamy. 1 CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 684
(Robert E. Emery ed., 2013).
140
California was the first state to introduce no fault divorce. On January 1,
1970, California’s Family Law Act became effective. The Act listed two grounds for
divorce: “[i]rreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown
of the marriage” and incurable insanity. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4506 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (providing California’s modern rule for no fault
divorce). “The basic . . . change [made by the Act was the] elimination of fault or
guilt as grounds for granting or denying divorce . . . .” Cary v. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr.
862, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). The California legislature did away with the
requirement of a showing of fault for a few reasons: it caused the parties to dig up
old wounds that they otherwise may have forgiven or forgotten; the evidence of
blame only served to show that the marital differences were insoluble; and it only
exacerbated the negative effect divorce had on the parties’ children. See Assemb.
Daily Journal, Cal. Legislature, 1969 Regular Sess. 8058 (Jan. 6, 1969). California
courts recognized that the idea of no fault divorce was relatively unpopular “because
137
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may cling to an archaic legal norm, refusing to adapt public
policy even in the face of changing norms across the country.141
Family law is a reflection of shared values within a particular
jurisdiction. Close scrutiny must be given to any state law that
provides a forum to nonresidents to circumvent the law of their
home state.142 Such state laws flirt with the due process rights of
the nonresident defendant and disrespect the sovereignty and
public policy of the defendant’s home state. The Court of Appeals
in Mississippi does precisely that by affirming the state’s
personal jurisdiction over Floridian Anna Cladakis and by
providing both a forum and a cause of action for Miller’s claim of
damages for her broken Tennessee marriage to Daly.143

it permits a spouse guilty of morally reprehensible conduct to take advantage of that
conduct in terminating marriage against the wishes of an entirely unoffending
spouse.” Walton v. Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). However,
the court maintained that
“[w]hile this may be true and while such a result may be offensive to those
steeped in the tradition of personal responsibility based upon fault, this
contention presents no issue cognizable in the courts . . . It is not the
province of the courts to inquire into the wisdom of legislative enactments.”
Id.
141
Only three states still require a showing of fault for a unilateral divorce:
South Dakota, Mississippi, and Tennessee. The South Dakota legislature recently
rejected House Bill 1221, which would have created unilateral no fault divorce in the
state; South Dakota still requires a showing of fault to grant unilateral divorces. See
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-2 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. and Spec.
Sess.); SD House Votes Down Unilateral No-Fault Divorce Proposal, KDLT NEWS
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.kdlt.com/2015/02/26/sd-house-votes-down-unilateral-nofault-divorce-proposal. Mississippi also requires a showing of fault for unilateral
divorces: “Divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be granted on the ground of
irreconcilable differences, but only upon the joint complaint of the husband and
wife,” or where the defendant has been given notice. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). Finally, Tennessee also requires a
showing of fault for unilateral divorce, unless both parties agree to all terms. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-101 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.) (providing
the grounds for divorce); id. § 36-4-103(e) (Westlaw) (providing that a divorce may
not be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences unless both parties
agree).
142
Ironically, the legislators of Mississippi are adamant that Mississippi’s public
policy regarding degrees of consanguinity in lawful marriage (the marrying of one’s
first cousin, for example) not be circumvented by the public policy of other states.
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-3 (West), Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“Any
attempt to evade Section 93-1-1 by marrying out of this state and returning to it
shall be within the prohibitions of said section.”).
143
Miller v. Provident Advert. and Mktg., Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 191 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2014).
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Mississippi’s Application of its Long-Arm Statute is Facially
Unreasonable and Violative of State Sovereignty and Public
Policy

The Supreme Court requires that jurisdiction must be
reasonable to avoid offending “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”144 In determining whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable, a court is to look at a multitude of
factors, including: the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute, the burden on the defendant, the availability of an
alternative forum, and the shared interests of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.145 An
analysis of these factors necessarily and unequivocally leads to
the conclusion that Mississippi’s assertion of jurisdiction is
patently unreasonable; it violates not only the Due Process
Rights of the parties, but also the Fourteenth-Amendmentensured sovereignty of Tennessee.
First, Mississippi lacks any real interest in adjudicating this
dispute, apart from forcing its domestic relations law on the rest
of the states. This case involves a Tennessee marriage, a
Tennessee divorce, and a couple domiciled in Tennessee. The
plaintiff is not a resident of Mississippi. States have a “manifest
interest in providing effective means of redress for [their]
residents,”146 but this “legitimate interest[s] [is] considerably
diminished” when the parties are not residents of the forum
state.147
Next, Mississippi argues that the burden on Cladakis of
hearing the case in Mississippi is low: “Cladakis availed herself
of the ‘privilege of conducting activities’ with Daly in the state of
Mississippi, we do not find it improper to bring her back into
Mississippi to defend the alienation-of-affection case that arose
out of those alleged activities.”148 This again misinterprets the
alienation of affection claim. The breakdown of the Dalys’
marriage did not occur in Mississippi, but rather Tennessee. Ms.
Cladakis is a Florida resident. The burden on Cladakis to travel
to Mississippi to defend this suit is high.

144
145
146
147
148

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355. U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
Miller, 155 So. 3d at 194.
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Third, Mississippi argues that it has a strong interest in
adjudicating the dispute because it offers the only forum for
Miller to obtain a remedy: “Miller lacks a viable alternative to
adjudicate [the alienation of affection claim], since both
Tennessee and Florida have abolished alienation-of-affection as a
cause of action. This fact increases Mississippi’s interest in
adjudicating this claim.”149 This is a gross misapplication of the
law. There are two appropriate, alternative forums: Tennessee
and Florida. Tennessee has an interest in the Dalys’ marriage,
divorce, and the remedies arising from their relationship.
Florida has personal jurisdiction over Cladakis, as she is a
resident of that state. These interests are infinitely stronger
than Mississippi’s. Moreover, even though both states have
abolished alienation of affection rules, Tennessee and Florida
have choice-of-law rules. If they felt that Mississippi’s interests
were so critical, they could simply choose to apply the law of
Mississippi. Thus, Mississippi is not the only forum for this case.
Mississippi’s actions further undercut the sovereignty of
Tennessee and Florida vis-à-vis their residents.
Fourth, Tennessee and Mississippi do not “share[]
interest[s] . . . in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.”150 Tennessee and Florida have expressly rejected the
alienation of affection tort on public policy grounds, so there is
absolutely no shared interest in furthering the application of the
statute.151 The statutory codes of Tennessee and Florida have
removed from the courts of Tennessee and Florida, respectively,
the power to compensate Miller for her broken heart.152
Furthermore, states that have abolished alienation of affections
are loathe to backdoor a heart balm claim through another cause

149

Id.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
151
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess. of
the 25th Leg.) (“The rights of action heretofore existing to recover sums of money as
damage for the alienation of affections . . . [is] hereby abolished.”); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-701 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.) (“The common law tort
action of alienation of affection is hereby abolished”).
152
See Rothrock v. Cooke, No. 14CVS870, 2014 WL 2973066 at *1 (N.C. Super.
Ct. June 11, 2014) (Judge J. O. Craig III sidestepped the public policy arguments for
abolishing alienation of affection and criminal conversation in North Carolina by
noting that the “North Carolina Supreme Court . . . has unequivocally held that
changes in the law based on public policy rest solely within the prerogatives of the
legislative branch of government, not the judicial.”).
150
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of action.153 If the courts of Tennessee are without power to
vitiate the clearly articulated public policy of the anti-heart balm
legislation in Tennessee, how much more impotent ought the
courts of other jurisdictions be to veto Tennessee law as it applies
to Tennessee marriages.
The jurisdictional question can be succinctly formulated as
follows: When the Mississippi public policy directly conflicts with
the Tennessee public policy, which state’s public policy should
be—and should be reasonably expected by the parties to be—
applicable to a Tennessee plaintiff aggrieved with a Florida
defendant over the breakdown of a Tennessee marriage? Though
the Mississippi judges might fancy themselves as necessary
outliers in the protection against the interference with marriage,
the dictates of state sovereignty and due process block
Mississippi’s crusade at the Tennessee state line.
In sum, Mississippi’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the parties is facially unreasonable and violates U.S. Supreme
Court precedent.
By asserting personal jurisdiction and
entertaining this out-of-state dispute, Mississippi imposes the
tort of alienation of affection upon Tennessee and Florida, which
long ago expressly rejected the tort.154 Should Mississippi be
permitted to police the region and impose its public policy on
other states, the doctrine of state sovereignty will be corrupted.
Mississippi’s actions offend the courts and state legislatures of
Tennessee and Florida, and invite similar wrongs against other
states in future cases.
2.

Mississippi Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Miller’s Case

Mississippi’s claim of jurisdiction over Anna Cladakis is a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as the parties have no meaningful connection to or
contacts with Mississippi.
Burger King v. Rudzewicz requires that the defendant have
minimum contacts with the forum in order for the state to assert
personal jurisdiction.155 “Minimum contacts” may arise from the
defendant purposefully availing herself to the forum state156 or

153
154
155
156

See Bailey v. Faulkner, 940 So. 2d 247, 250, 253 (Ala. 2006).
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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from foreseeability of the lawsuit.157 Even if minimum contacts
exist, the assertion of personal jurisdiction may not be so
unreasonable or unfair as to violate Due Process.158 Here, the
Dalys lack any meaningful connection with Mississippi. Cladakis
did not purposely avail herself to the jurisdiction of
Mississippi,159 nor, presumably, did she believe a lawsuit in
Mississippi was foreseeable. Even if Cladakis did have minimum
contacts with Mississippi, it would be grossly unreasonable and
unfair for Mississippi to assert personal jurisdiction over her.
The tort of alienation of affection requires proof that a
previously solid marriage broke down to the point where it was
terminated due to the acts of another.160 The real focus of this
tort is on the breakdown of the marriage, not on the commission
of the sexual acts which contributed to the breakdown of the
marriage.161 At the time of Daly’s and Cladakis’ alleged venture
into Tunica, the Dalys were already separated;162 they did not
have a solid marriage. The actual “harm” was the termination of
the marriage, which occurred in Tennessee.163 Only a tiny
portion of the acts which could sustain the tort of alienation of
affections occurred in Mississippi; no cause of action arose there.
The dissolution of Miller’s marriage to Daly occurred entirely

157
158

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113–14

(1987).
159
The Mississippi Court of Appeals held that Cladakis did, in fact, avail herself
to the jurisdiction of Mississippi by engaging in sexual activity in that state. Miller
v. Provident Advert. & Mktg., Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 193 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). For
mere public policy reasons, this is a far-reaching conclusion. Mississippi cannot
possibly argue that every individual who has had sex in that state has availed
themselves to the laws of Mississippi.
160
See Cotter, supra note 36.
161
The heart balm action of criminal conversation, on the other hand, arises
from extramarital sexual acts. It does not require showing of a breakdown in the
marriage. However, Mississippi abolished this tort. Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d
1214, 1219 (Miss. 1992) (In abolishing the tort of criminal conversation, the court
held, “[f]or the several reasons enumerated above we conclude that the tort of
criminal conversation has outlived its usefulness.”).
162
Steve DelVecchio, John Daly’s Ex-Wife Suing His Fiancee For HomeWrecking, LARRY BROWN SPORTS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://larrybrownsports.com/golf/jo
hn-dalys-ex-wife-suing-his-fiancee-for-home-wrecking/254909.
163
Cladakis could also argue that Florida has a better case for exercising
jurisdiction over the case because she is a resident of that state; however, Florida
abolished the tort of alienation of affection in 1945. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess. of the 25th Leg.). This fact makes Mississippi’s
exercise of jurisdiction all the more unreasonable.
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within the state of Tennessee—the only state with authority to
dissolve that union. Arguably, Miller’s allegations of adultery, if
proven, between Daly and Cladakis while parked within the
state of Mississippi would support a claim for damages under the
tort of criminal conversation were it not for the fact that the
Mississippi Supreme Court had previously repudiated that
tort.164 Asserting jurisdiction in this case circumvents Supreme
Court precedent and violates Cladakis’ and Daly’s due process
rights.
3.

Mississippi’s Assertion of Jurisdiction Creates
Inconsistencies Within Tennessee

In Windsor, the Supreme Court explained that “[m]arriage
laws may vary from State to State, but they are consistent within
Mississippi is creating inconsistencies in
each State.”165
Tennessee marriages, despite the fact that Tennessee has
expressly stated its public policy regarding alienation of affection
and other heart balm actions.166 In doing so, Mississippi has
“diminish[ed] the stability and predictability of basic personal
relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and
protect.”167 For example, had Mr. Daly and Ms. Cladakis stopped
at a rest stop on the Tennessee side of the Tennessee-Mississippi
border rather than continuing on to Tunica, there would have
been no cause of action. Mississippi’s actions thus have created
an “unequal . . . subset of [Tennessee] sanctioned marriages.”168

164

Saunders, 607 So. 2d at 1219.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013). In Windsor, a
surviving spouse of a same-sex, married couple was denied federal tax benefits
available to heterosexual, married couples. Id. at 2683. The Supreme Court found
the federal statute unconstitutional on the basis that this same-sex married couple
was treated differently than other married couples, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 2695. Even though Windsor deals with a federal statute,
much of the Court’s analysis is applicable to the case at hand. The Court reiterated
the fact that domestic relations are historically within the province of state law. It
also noted that federal law may supersede state law when that law is violative of the
Constitution. Id. at 2695–96; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05
(2015).
166
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-701 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg.
Sess.).
167
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
168
Id. at 2681.
165
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Mississippi’s Actions Will Inflict Financial Harm on
Tennessee

The Supreme Court held in Windsor that the federal Defense
of Marriage Act was inappropriate as it would levy financial
harm against families.169 It is even more inappropriate for
another state—Mississippi—to levy financial harm against
residents of Tennessee and Florida. Cladakis’ defense of Miller’s
alienation of affections law suit generated substantial legal fees.
The trial court had awarded Cladakis $78,307.22 in legal fees
finding that Miller’s lawsuit was groundless;170 however, this
award was reversed by the Court of Appeals.171 In addition, the
court took judicial notice of the “not great” distance between
Mississippi and Florida, thereby minimizing the cost to Cladakis
to defend a lawsuit in Mississippi.172 Neither travel costs nor
attorneys’ fees, however, are the true cost of this alienation of
affections lawsuit. Nor are the compensatory and exorbitant
punitive damages awarded to the successful plaintiff.173 The true
cost emerges as “[a]dversarial pressures and competitive
economic impulses inevitably work to impair significantly, if not
frustrate completely, the attainment of postdivorce harmony.”174
5.

Most Shockingly, Mississippi’s Law Creates a National Law
of Domestic Relations, in Direct Violation of Supreme Court
Precedent

“[T]here is no federal law of domestic relations.”175 If there is
no federal law of domestic relations, there should be no
Mississippi law of domestic relations that extends beyond its
borders. Mississippi is attempting to make itself national law for
alienation of affection claims.176 This paternalistic approach
violates state sovereignty.

169

Id. at 2695.
Miller v. Provident Adver. & Mktg., Inc., 155 So. 3d 181, 187 (Miss. Ct. App.
2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2862 (2015).
171
Id. at 197.
172
Id. at 194.
173
Alice Gomstyn & Lee Ferran, Wife’s $9M Message to Mistresses: ‘Lay Off,’
ABC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Business/wife-wins-millionhusbands-alleged-mistress-story?id=10177637.
174
Davidson, supra note 94, at 660.
175
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
176
See Miller, 155 So. 3d at 194 (“The Legislature, in modifying our state’s longarm statute in 1980, expressed the public policy of the state to provide a forum for
170
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Mississippi asserts that because Tennessee has explicitly
repealed alienation of affection claims, it has a duty to offer this
tort action to all who seek it.177 Obligations in marriage are not
universal; states define marriage obligations for themselves. The
federal government has refused to redefine the marriage
relationships that states have created.178 Tennessee defined and
created the relationship between the Dalys. Mississippi, then, is
wrong to insert itself into the Dalys’ marriage. Mississippi may
not redefine the Dalys’ obligations—whether they be moral,
financial, or legal—with respect to the relationship that
Tennessee created. Allowing Mississippi to create a national law
for alienation of affection will only serve to further water down
state sovereignty in the realm of domestic relations and tort law.
B.

North Carolina’s Long-Arm Just Got Shorter

Alienation of affections has enjoyed a prominent and
lucrative run in North Carolina, prominent in the frequency of
cases filed179 and lucrative for the plaintiffs as million dollar
verdicts are not uncommon.180 As in Mississippi, the North
Carolina long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant whose actions constitute minimum
contacts with the state.181 Whether those contacts comprise
phone calls,182 emails,183 or sexual encounters,184 the Supreme

nonresidents to pursue compensation for torts committed in whole or in part in this
state.”).
177
Id.
178
See infra Part V.A.
179
Rothrock v. Cooke, No. 14CVS870, 2014 WL 2973066, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct.
June 11, 2014) (noting that North Carolina courts routinely hear cases pertaining to
alienation of affections). It is estimated that over 200 alienation of affections cases
are filed in North Carolina each year. Infidelity & Alienation of Affection, ROSEN L.
FIRM,
www.rosen.com/divorce/divorcearticles/alienation-of-affection-and-criminalconversation (last visited June 25, 2017).
180
See Gomstyn & Ferran, supra note 173.
181
Cooper v. Shealy, 537 S.E.2d 854, 857 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he North
Carolina long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction since the plaintiff’s injury
allegedly occurred within North Carolina and was allegedly caused by the
defendant’s solicitation of plaintiff’s husband’s love and affection by telephoning
plaintiff’s home in North Carolina.”).
182
Id.
183
Crockett v. Prantner, No. COA11-1565, 2012 WL 4076463, at *7 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2012).
184
Jones v. Skelley, 673 S.E.2d 385, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
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Court of North Carolina has consistently recognized that “North
Carolina has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from local
injury caused by the tortious conduct of [nonresidents].”185
Within North Carolina, alienation of affections is not without
limitations. In 2003, the Court of Appeals held that contacts by a
nonresident defendant with North Carolina were insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction.186 That court noted that the
Tennessee plaintiff’s decision to sue the California defendant for
alienation of affections in North Carolina “smacks of forumshopping.”187 However, the tort remains despite attempts to
abolish this common law cause of action whether stemming from
the North Carolina Court of Appeals188 or the General
Assembly.189
Completely sidestepping the myriad of public policy
arguments that have underscored the near universal demise of
the heart balm torts, a lower court judge in North Carolina
recently penned a novel attack on the validity of alienation of
affections. In Rothrock v. Cooke,190 Superior Court Judge John O.
Craig III held that both alienation of affections and criminal
conversation are unconstitutional both facially and as applied to
the facts as due process violations of the liberty and privacy
interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This attack
by a North Carolina lower court may not ultimately announce
the death of alienation of affections in North Carolina. But for
now, Mississippi stands alone in its unjustifiable love affair with
alienation of affections.

185

Cooper, 537 S.E.2d at 858.
Eluhu v. Rosenhaus, 583 S.E.2d 707, 712 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
187
Id. at 711.
188
See Cannon v. Miller, 322 S.E.2d 780, 784 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), vacated, 327
S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 1985) (The Court of Appeals’ concluded that there was no “legal or
logical basis” for alienations of affections was overturned by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina).
189
See Sherry Honeycutt Everett, The Law of Alienation of Affections After
McCutchen v. McCutchen: In North Carolina, Breaking Up Just Got Harder To Do,
85 N.C. L. REV. 1761, 1767–68 (2007).
190
Rothrock v. Cooke, No. 14CVS870, 2014 WL 2973066, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct.
June 11, 2014).
186
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FAMILY LAW POLICY IS—AND SHOULD BE—THE CREATION OF
STATE LAW

States have the exclusive right and power to regulate
domestic relations. “By history and tradition the definition and
regulation of marriage has been treated as being within the
authority and realm of the separate States.”191 This is for good
reason—states have a fundamental interest in regulating family
law due to its importance to society. Marriage has traditionally
been the basis of the family unit where “we inculcate and pass
down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”192
Marriage thus has been understood not merely as being “a
routine classification for purposes of certain statutory
benefits,”193 but rather an intrinsic human right that is “older
than the Bill of Rights.”194 The power to regulate marriage rests
with the state such that federal courts—absent a showing of
diversity or federal question jurisdiction—lack authority to try
family law cases.195 An action by an ex-spouse seeking damages
against the person she holds responsible for the breakdown of her
marriage goes to the very heart of a state’s public policy
regarding the regulation of marriage and should be decided by
state courts.196

191
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013); see also Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (noting that the power to regulate domestic relations
has “long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States”).
192
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (“[T]he
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.”).
193
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
194
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
195
This is known as the “domestic relations exception.” Although federal courts
are not prohibited from hearing cases “involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony,
or child custody decree,” there is a presumption against them doing so. Ankenbrandt
v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992). See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858) for
an overview of the domestic relations exception. There, a federal court was asked to
hear a tort case involving ex-spouses. Id. at 584. The non-moving party attempted to
invoke the domestic relations exception, which they argued prohibited the federal
court from hearing a family law case. Id. at 588. The Barber court disagreed,
reasoning that federal diversity jurisdiction gave the court authority to hear the
case. Id. at 592. There may be some erosion occurring with respect to the adherence
to the domestic relations exception to the jurisdiction of federal courts in postdivorce tort actions. See, e.g., Jones v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2003).
196
Cotter, supra note 36 (citing Andrews v. Patterson, 585 F. Supp. 553
(M.D.N.C. 1984)).
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Tennessee’s domestic relations statute is contained in
Chapter 36 of the Tennessee Code Annotated.
Tennessee
regulates who may marry, the process of applying for a marriage
license, who may officiate the wedding, the obligations arising
from marriage, as well as the divorce process.197 Remedies within
marriage are another subset of categories that states may define.
Conversely, the United States Code deals with marriage and
divorce for survivorship, tax, and insurance purposes.198 Of
course, there is no federal process for marriage or divorce,
because “there is no federal law of domestic relations.”199
A.

The Constitutional Exception

A state’s interest in the institution of marriage, while
fundamental,200 is not final.201 Rights or remedies attendant to
marriage within one state may be extended to residents of
another state whose laws circumscribe marriage rights and
remedies broadly. In fact, the legal quest for the recognition of
more permissive marriage laws co-opted from another may result
in a constitutional challenge to the more narrowly framed rights
and remedies of the sister state. The right to marry is protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment;202 so federal law may supersede
state law when it violates the Constitution.203 Such has been the
recent history of state laws restricting marriage204 and adoption
to heterosexual couples.205
197
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-101 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg.
Sess.) (providing an overview of who may marry in Tennessee); id. § 36-3-301
(Westlaw) (prescribing who may officiate a wedding); and id. § 36-4-101 (Westlaw)
(outlining Tennessee’s divorce procedures).
198
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8345 (2012) (prescribing the payment of benefits to
federal employees and their spouses); 42 U.S.C. § 416 (2012) (defining “marriage,”
“divorce,” “wife,” and “husband” for social welfare purposes).
199
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
200
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978).
201
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7,
11–12 (1967).
202
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The absence of dispute
reflected this Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in
matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978))).
203
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05
(“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right in the liberty of the person, and under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court
now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.”);
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However, federal law does not provide answers to conflicts
between states over rights and remedies which lack
Constitutional significance. If the Constitution itself contains no
basis for denying Tennessee the authority to repudiate the tort of
alienation of affections, how can the Courts of Mississippi wield
such power over Tennessee? Left unchecked, the public policy of
Mississippi through its long-arm statute’s inappropriate embrace
of nonresidents could be imposed on residents of all fifty states.
B.

Uniform Laws: The Exception Proves the Rule

In rare cases, the individual sovereignty of states in matters
of family law gives way to an overarching need for uniformity
among the states. Some aspects of family law require uniformity
across states because there is a need for consistency among the
states in order to make rulings or jurisdictional decisions
feasible.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) was drafted in 1997 and has since
been adopted in 49 of the 50 states. Massachusetts is the only
state that has not adopted the Act.206 The stated purposes of the
Act was to revise the child custody jurisdictional laws, in light of
federal enactments and years of inconsistent rulings, to clarify
jurisdictional questions, and to provide a uniform procedure of
interstate custody enforcement.207
Similarly, the Uniform Parentage Act is federal legislation
that helps establish guidelines for states in establishing
paternity of children born to unmarried parents.208 This Act was
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, 12 (striking down Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage
because the ban violated the couple’s Due Process rights).
204
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
205
See V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2016). In that case, the Alabama
Supreme Court refused to recognize a Georgia adoption and subsequent divorce
decree, where the parents were a homosexual couple. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed Alabama’s ruling, holding that Georgia had subject matter jurisdiction to
issue the divorce decree and parenting plan. Id. at 1022. Alabama had to abide by its
full faith and credit obligation. Id.
206
See Legislative Fact Sheet - Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,
UNIF. LAW COMM'N (1997) http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?
title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdiction%20and%20Enforcement%20Act.
207
Prefatory Note: Univ. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, NAT’L
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW (1997), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared
/docs/child_custody_jurisdiction/uccjea_final_97.pdf.
208
Prefatory Note: Uniform Parentage Act, NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAW (2002), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final
_2002.pdf.
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originally drafted in 1973, modernized in 2000, and then
amended in 2002.209 So far it has only been enacted in 11
states,210 but has been endorsed by numerous ABA Sections.211
This is another example of an area of family law that is better
served by uniformity, because paternity issues could be ongoing
and could be greatly affected by people moving across state lines.
Both the UCCJEA and the Uniform Parentage Act are Acts put
forth by the federal government to regulate family law, but the
federal government has still left implementation to the states,
thus reinforcing state autonomy.
While Federal IV-D Regulations require a uniform
application of child support guidelines throughout any given
state, the states are still free to determine their own provisions of
the guidelines on how to calculate support.212 This is just another
example of the federal government leaving most regulation of
families to the states, so that the states can further their
individual public policies and not the public policies of the federal
government.
To contrast, the Uniform Commercial Code regulates
business transactions because many business transactions take
place across numerous state lines and, therefore, uniformity is
essential.213 Businesses must have standardized rules, so that
they are better able to determine how to interact with each other
to make sales and contracts across the nation. But families are
not usually stretched across state borders in this manner, nor are
they dealing with one another at an arm’s length, and therefore,
state regulation is generally preferable.
The need for uniformity in heart balm torts, like most family
law actions, has not risen to the level of these other unique Acts.
Heart balm torts relate to an incident frozen in time, and are
never going to be an ongoing action, unlike the actions under the
jurisdiction of the UCCJEA and the Uniform Parentage Act. So
far, these torts have been left to the states, and many states have
deemed it necessary to abolish or at least minimize these actions.
209

Id.
Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act.
211
Legislative Fact Sheet - Parentage Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2002), http://www
.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act.
212
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If state legislatures and state courts decide that their state no
longer needs these actions or they do not wish to expand the
torts, this is rightfully within their power. The states know what
works for them and what policies they wish to cultivate.
C.

The Unnecessary Call for the Abolishment of Heart Balm
Actions

As a resident of Tennessee, a state whose well-considered
public policy against alienation of affections is legally sound, the
author could join the prolific scholarship calling for the uniform
abolition of heart balm laws.214 Yet this article stops short of that
battle cry, considering it to be an unnecessary infringement upon
the sovereignty of states. Nor does it join the pro-marriage
activists or the feminist scholars who, for very different policy
reasons find favor with the amatory torts.215 States are not
obligated to legislate equally, but rather are free to legislate
uniquely. If the policy makers in the state of Mississippi choose
to cling to the classic paradigms expressed by Prosser, namely
that alienation of affections statutes “give increased protection to
family interests and the sanctity of the home,” so be it.216 But no
long-arm statute should ever be long enough to force
Mississippi’s public policy upon the nonresidents of Mississippi,
whose home states have jettisoned alienation of affections as a
harmful cause of action which instead “diminish[es] human
dignity, demeans the participants, inflicts pain upon the innocent
and does not prevent human misconduct.”217

214
See Crissman, supra note 125, at 518 (arguing that South Dakota should
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ARIZ. L. REV. 323, 340 (1981); Cary & Scudder, supra note 127, at 26 (“North
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The author’s primary critique of Mississippi’s alienation of
affections statute stems from the Mississippi court’s
inappropriate extension of its domestic relations policy outside of
the state of Mississippi such that Mississippi effectively vetoes
the public policy of sister states. Secondly, the author criticizes
the sloppy application of the tort of alienation of affections to the
Daly facts. While the alleged facts in Daly, if proven, might
sustain an action for criminal conversation, such facts fail to
establish alienation of affections. Therefore, it is impermissible
for the courts of Mississippi, having abolished criminal
conversation, to nevertheless allow an action to proceed by
squeezing it into the remaining tort of alienation of affections.218
Mississippi is not its neighbor’s keeper, with respect to morality
torts or otherwise. If the legislators of Mississippi, elected by the
people of Mississippi, wish to provide redress to the residents of
Mississippi for a morality tort, Mississippi should be
applauded.219 But the tort required to fit the Daly facts would
resemble criminal conversation, not the alienation of affections
statute as currently enacted in Mississippi.
One commentator has suggested an interesting corollary
between the rise of no fault divorce and the rise of domestic tort
actions, namely, that “no fault divorce has deprived some spouses
of the opportunity to give the judge evidence of the other spouse’s
marital sins.”220 The anger and frustration that once were
channeled into the fault aspects of a divorce action may now lead
to an independent lawsuit by one spouse against the other or, in
the case of heart balm torts, by one spouse against the alienator.
If Mississippi wishes to cultivate post-divorce anger and
218
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that have barred alienation of affection, a party cannot backdoor a claim via a
different cause of action. 940 So. 2d 247, 253 (Ala. 2006). It follows, then, that if
courts in Tennessee lack the power to offer alienation of affection as a cause of action
to Tennessee residents, Mississippi should likewise lack that power. Further,
Mississippi has barred the tort of criminal conversation, but is essentially allowing
Sherrie Miller to allege it through the tort of alienation of affection.
219
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(2001); cf. Heard, supra note 54, at 334 (“[l]ike other supporters of abolition,
[Mississippi Supreme Court] Justice Dickinson found the current rationale
underlying the tort to be a legal fiction – stating several times that the tort does not,
in fact, preserve or stabilize a marital union. . . . [Instead], alienation actions have
‘outlived any relevance or usefulness they may have once possessed . . . .’ ”).
220
See Robert G. Spector, All in the Family—Tort Litigation Comes of Age, 28
FAM. L. Q. 393 (1994).
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frustration by providing a tort and a forum for its residents, no
other state has reason to object. However, Mississippi’s selfperceived role as the haven for the wounded hearts of
nonresidents violates due process.
CONCLUSION
Arguably, the heart balm torts have outlived their relevance
in a society where marriage is no longer a necessary imprimatur
for intimate relations,221 and where broken hearts and failed
marriages are the statistical norm.222 A state’s resolute rejection
of the heart balm torts in principle as well as applied to modern
domestic relations mores need be checked neither by
Constitutional protections of marriage nor by the need for
uniformity among sister states. Therefore, one state need not
and must not transport its domestic relations public policy across
state lines. Mississippi’s expansive jurisdictional embrace of
nonresidents, John Daly and Anna Cladakis, based upon their
alleged temporary embrace of each other, violates Anna Cladakis’
due process rights while providing a forum for Daly’s
opportunistic ex-wife to pursue publicity and monetary damages
by vitiating the clear public policy of her home state of
Tennessee.

221
One author has proposed a modification of the amatory torts noting that
“America is ready for a tort that protects against outside interference with all
intimate adult relationships.” See Deans, supra note 37, at 383.
222
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American life. For people on the wealthier side of the class divide, life is better than
it used to be in many ways. For people on the other side, the situation is much more
complicated.” Claire Cain Miller, The Divorce Surge is Over, but the Myth Lives on,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/upshot/the-divorcesurge-is-over-but-the-myth-lives-on.html.

